The current scheme of access control judges the legality of each access based on immediate information without considering associate information hidden in a series of accesses. Due to the deficiency, access control systems do not efficiently limit attacks consist of ordinary operations. For trusted operating system developments, we extended RBAC and added negative procedural constraints to refuse those attacks. With the procedural constraints, the access control of trusted operating systems can discriminate attack trials from normal behaviors. This paper shows the specification of the extended concept and model, and presents simple analysis results.
Introduction
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is the totality of a computer system's protection mechanisms [1] - [3] . TCB enforces a unified security policy to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.
The development of a trusted operating system embodies the concept of TCB by placing a security kernel as a central mechanism and providing other security services such as authentication, encryption, audit, and so on. The security kernel implements the reference monitor concept. The reference monitor mediates all accesses under access control policies. The access control mechanism of the security kernel is essential to trusted operating system developments.
Traditionally, general UNIX-compatible operating systems have controlled accesses under Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policy. However, DAC does not support a sufficient level of security. Early trusted operating system developments adopted a supplementary policy of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [4] - [6] . Yet, MAC is too strict to be applied to commercial applications due to the lack of flexibility in executions. Therefore, recent trusted operating system developments [7] - [9] introduce Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
Though various access control policies have been applied, current access control has limitations in its function. The limitation originates from the discreteness of access control information.
At each time of the access, a security kernel gathers information from the subject, the object, and the system environment. However, the relation information between accesses is not considered for making an access decision. Even if the execution of an operation set results in an attack, each element can be allowed separately. In other words, if an attack is composed of permitted operations, and each of the operation does not violate the access rules and the policy of the system, then the access control system does not deny the attack. This is similar to the mistake of a silly detective who estimates the direction of a thief by confirming just one of the footprints (See Fig. 1 ).
In this paper, we discuss the extended concept and the model of access control to prevent the exploits consist of ordinary operations. For the extension, we adopt the notion of history-based control mechanisms and behavior modeling which have been applied to the field of workflow systems and intrusion detection systems (IDS), respectively. By the extended control, access decisions are not only made from instantly gathered information, but also associated information of accesses. The associated information is stored as the form of a procedure. Moreover, we adopt the concept of negative permissions to describe attack sequences.
Finally, the access control system tests whether an execution of each operation completes an attack procedure, hence block intrusions effectively. The integrated security service of intrusion detection and access control is suitable for embedded systems. In embedded environment, we do not have enough resources to operate such a security solution as intrusion detection system. RBAC is extended with the additional properties in this paper. The concept of the abstraction in RBAC is useful to associate operations and give procedural constraints to the sets of operations.
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This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the motives and related work. In Sect. 3, the extended RBAC concept and its model are described The analysis of the proposed access control is discussed in Sect. 4. Sect. 5 is the related work, and Sect. 6 is the conclusion.
Preliminaries

Abstractions in RBAC
Recently developed trusted operating systems [7] - [9] have introduced RBAC as their major security policy. Providing several advantages [10] , [11] , RBAC compensates for the lack of ability of the traditional policies.
The advantages stem from abstraction mechanisms. RBAC provides the abstraction based on role entities. A role is the association between a set of users and a set of permissions. The role is useful to manage authorities. The security officer can give or deprive user's permission by assigning or withdrawing the role. Also, the defined roles can have some constraints or hierarchical organizations for more convenient authority managements [10] .
For the extension in Sect. 2.3, it is necessary to investigate the characteristics of the RBAC abstraction in this Section. The abstractions in RBAC can be classified as subject-abstraction and object-abstraction based on the inherent property of an access; an access is the interaction between a subject and an object.
The subject-abstraction is organizing users as roles based on users' real-world organization. Some roles reflect the real positions and responsibilities of users such as 'Doctor', 'Nurse' or 'Patient', so that the administrator can grasp comparatively clear image on whom to be assigned. Several examples are presented in previous researches [10] - [13] .
On the other hand, the object-abstraction is specifying system resources as roles. Such roles as 'Accounting', 'Auditing' are the result of the object-abstraction. They consist of primitive operations of a target system, and give ideas of what are the functions of the roles.
The abstractions can constitute a systematic structure, called 'hierarchy'. Semantically or functionally related roles are associated each other with inheritance relationships, and a role can be defined in the hierarchy. The hierarchy improves reusability of role definitions and helps reflecting real-world user organizations. Finally, it reduces administrative costs. Moffett [14] categorized constructing methods in the hierarchy constitutions as aggregation, generalization, and organization. Figure 2 shows a result of the organization. Such advantages from the abstraction in RBAC are similar to the advantages of the object-oriented approach of software engineering.
Also, roles are useful to constrain subjects and objects. Separation of duty (SOD) relationships can be defined between roles to prohibit two or more roles being assigned to a particular user. More various conditions such as access time, access domain can be applied to limit accesses properly. Although the concept of roles has not been biased in one direction, the abstractions of RBAC have been studied partially. Most of noted researches on role hierarchy have focused on the subject-abstraction. Context information for building role hierarchies has been mainly extracted from user organizations. The examples in the researches [10] , [14] , [16] show how the hierarchies are constructed based on user organizations. Figure 2 presents one of the example.
On the other hand, describing resources as abstracted forms and controlling accesses are important for system implementations like trusted operating systems. The extended access control concept which is mentioned in Sect. 1 can be accomplished by constraining and organizing permissions as the form of procedures. Hence, we concentrate upon the object-abstraction of RBAC in this paper.
Motives of the Extension
Access control information has gained from users and objects at each time of an access. To check permissions and make an access decision, the information is used instantly. However, the instant decision restricts the functions of access control system. Assume that permissions on file accesses are defined as {fexec, fread, fwrite, flink, funlink} in a system. When a user tries to remove a link of the file, a traditional access control system gets information from the user and the file, and checks if the acquired roles of the user have funlink on the file. At the next moment, if the user tries to make a symbolic link to the file, a similar process is performed again. However, the correlation between two actions, unlink and link, is not a matter of concern. The access control system considers the latter action is totally independent to the former, so that the permissions are tested severally. If the user have both link and unlink permissions to the file, the user can repeat link and unlink to the file. Though the repetition is an important signature of the race condition attacks, there is no control.
However, if we use the well-defined object-abstractions with an order and the properties that describes harmful executions, we can limit above kinds of accesses and improve the functions of access control.
Assume that we have a set of permissions {A, B, C, D}. If they are required for a role's task completion, we have assigned all the permissions to the role traditionally. However, if the task needs only one series of permissions like (A, C, B, D), we do not have to allow all combination of permissions to the role. In other words, in the traditional scheme, we have given more authorities to the role than needs. If we check sequences of accesses, we are able to reject the abuse of permissions in an unexpected order. The ordered control helps to keep the principle of least privilege.
Also, we can describe the SOD relationships more accurately. If the sequence of (A, C, B, D) is in SOD relation with the permission order of (B, A, D, C), we can observe the principle of separation of duty more properly. The researches on the ordered sequences of operations for SOD enfocement and the approaches on behavior modeling have been dealt with in the field of workflow systems and intrusion detection systems. The relativity and difference will be discussed in Sect. 5 In addition to the notion of the permission sequence, adopting the concept of negative permission [2] into RBAC, we can expect that access control systems to refuse attack trials efficiently. It is possible to define a harmful behavior as a 'negative' set of permissions by appending a tag on the set of permissions.
For example, a race condition attack [17] , [18] sends a mail and repeats link/unlink actions in sequence. Therefore, if we limit the repetition of link and unlink after a mail-send operation, we can refuse the attack trials.
Those attacks have been out of range of access control. Instead, applications such as Firewall and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are adopted for current commercial environments to block those attacks. However, those application-level solutions are not fundamental because of the possibility of by-passing [19] .
Gollmann [2] described the reasons for putting security mechanisms into the lower layers: Higher assurance of security and lower performance overheads. Hence, the better solution is placing control mechanisms for those attacks at the kernel level of trusted operating system. It corresponds to the motivation of trusted operating system developments [20] .
There is one more reason to adopt the kind of intrusion detection service to the access control services. As mentioned in the Sect. 1, in such environments which have limited resources as embedded systems, it is hard to run IDSs usually. The application level security solutions generally needs computational power rather than kernel based executions. To apply the trusted operating system technology to embedded systems, we need the integrated and advanced access control service which is a real-time, low overhead solution based on kernel operations.
The Extended Properties
For the purpose of controlling accesses with an advanced manner, following properties are added to RBAC.
• procedural information: Order and repetition information describe a permission set procedurally.
• positive/negative information: The information indicates whether a set of permissions are harmful of not.
• other constraints: Various information can be added for a precise control such as access time, limited lapse from execution start, owner of the objects, and so on. However, these constraints are not dealt with in this paper for a simplicity.
Although the additional information are useful for the object-abstraction, but not for the subject-abstraction. For example, roles such as 'Doctor', 'Nurse' do not need to have order or repetition information. When those properties are added to the subject-abstraction, we expect that some kinds of disadvantages as follows.
• implementation overhead: The fields for order or repetition will be overhead for the role like 'Bank manager'. Also, we need to write unessential functions to initialize and manipulate those fields, and system will invoke those functions.
• semantical estrangement: It is not semantically clear that the subject-abstraction and the object-abstraction are co-exist in a same layer of 'Roles'. Moreover, confusions from the coexistence can cause erroneous relationships by introducing cycles in a role hierarchy.
To avoid disadvantages, it is considerable to separate the subject-abstraction and the object-abstraction. Roles for the object-abstration can be separated from roles for the subject-abstration in RBAC. We name newly separated roles for the object-abstraction as 'Behaviors'. As a consequence of the separation, the modified concept consists of four main entities of users, roles, behaviors, permissions.
Extended RBAC Model
We name the extended access control as Role-Behavior Based Access Control (RBBAC) for convenience' sake. In this section, we describe the model of RBBAC. The description of the RBBAC model is also extended and modified from the standard RBAC model [16] .
The RBBAC model specification starts from the core RBBAC model. Core RBBAC just adds an additional abstraction entity, behavior, to RBAC. After the core RBBAC model is described, we introduce the constrained RBBAC model. Constrained RBBAC adds the concept of Procedural Restrictions (PR) to core RBBAC. PR enables a system to control operations elaborately by restraining behaviors to be executed in order. Figure 3 shows basic RBBAC elements and relations. The basic elements are users, roles, behaviors, and permissions. Users are subjects of all accesses. Roles are the semantic representatives for users. A role is defined as a set of users. Permissions are objects of all accesses. Permissions are derived from the combinations of resource objects and access modes. Behaviors are the semantic representatives for permissions as roles do. A behavior is defined as a set of permissions. Sessions are associations between users and roles. Basic relations are subject assignments (SA), access rules (AR), and object assignments (OA). As Fig. 3 shows, SA consists of one-to-one user-session mapping and many-tomany session-role associations. AR is the relation between roles and behaviors. In terms of reference monitor, roles and behaviors are the representatives of the actual access subjects and objects, respectively. Hence, AR is the essential security rules limiting subjects' accesses to objects. OA is the relation between behavior and permissions. Above descriptions are formally described as follows.
Core RBBAC Model
Definition 1 (Core RBBAC):
• USERS, ROLES, BE-HAVS, and PERMS: the set of users, roles, behaviors, and permissions, respectively.
• SA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, the many-to-many user-to-role assignment.
• assigned users : (r : ROLES) → 2 US ERS , the mapping from a role r onto a set of users, -assigned users(r) = {u ∈ USERS |(u, r) ∈ S A}
• OA ⊆ BEHAVS × PERMS, the many-to-many permission-to-behavior assignment.
• assigned permissions : (b : BEHAVS) → 2 PERMS , the mapping of a behavior b onto a set of permissions,
• SESSIONS: the set of sessions.
• user session(u : USERS) → SESSIONS, the mapping from a user u onto a session.
• session role(s : SESSIONS) → ROLES, the mapping from a session s onto a role.
• AR ⊆ ROLES × BEHAVS, the many-to-many role-tobehavior assignment.
• assigned behaviors : (r : ROLES) → 2 BEHAVS , the mapping from a role r onto a set of behaviors,
On the basis of the above definitions, we define the following function of avail session permissions to decide whether an access is legal or not. It is the core mechanism of the access decision facilities of an access control system [21] .
• avail session permissions : (s : SESSIONS) → At the moment of a user accesses to a permission, access control system confirms the associations between the user's session and the permission, and makes an access decision. In core RBBAC model, the access decision process is consecutive; the system validates roles of the user, behaviors associated to the role, and permissions related with the behaviors. The function, avail session permissions implicates the consecutive process. The final step of the allowance is that the access control system's confirmation of the targeted permission is in the set of the validated permissions.
Constrained RBBAC Model
The constrained RBBAC model includes additional constraints of Procedural Restrictions (PR). Basic requirements for giving PR are precise access control and prohibition of dangerous executions. PR provides a solution for the requirements by giving ordering constraints to behaviors and a property for describing whether the ordered behaviors are harmful of not. Figure 4 shows the conceptual diagram of constrained RBBAC. We introduce several entities to establish the PR concept as follows.
• Procedural Unit (PU): The extended behavior with an order and an iteration number. If a PU is defined as ('copy', 2, 3), it means that the behavior 'copy' should be thirdly executed in the procedure and executed twice.
• Procedural Constraint (PC): A procedure consists of a set of PUs. And a PC contains an additional property that describes whether the PC is positive or negative. If it is positive, the procedure is executed step by step in a system. If it is negative, the execution of the procedure is blocked before the completion.
• Procedure History (PH): Behavior execution logs. If a permission is accessed, PH is recorded. And the log mainly contains such information as behavior, PU, PC, and sessions.
The following definitions summarize the above descriptions.
Definition 1 (Procedural Restrictions):
• PU ⊆ (BEHAVS× N × N) , the collection of (bs, itnum, onum), where each bs is a behavior, and itnum and onum are natural numbers. itnum implies maximum number of repetition for the behavior bs. onum indicates the order of execution for bs in the procedural unit.
• behavior punits : (b : BEHAVS) → 2 PU , the mapping from behavior b onto a set of procedural units which include the behavior as a constituent.
• PC ⊆ (2 PU × prop), the collection of pairs (punits, prop), where each punits is a set of procedural units and prop is POSITIVE or NEGATIVE.
• behavior pconstraints : (b : BEHAVS) → 2 PC , the mapping from behavior b onto a set of related PC. The returned PC includes PU in which behavior b participates as a constituent.
• pconstraints property(pc) : (pc : PC) → {POSITIVE, NEGATIVE}, the mapping of a PC to its property information. • PH ⊆ SESSIONS × ROLES × BEHAVS × N × PC, the collection of (s, r, b, n, pc), where each s is a session, r is a role, b is a behavior, n is a natural number which indicates order in a procedural constraints, and pc is the procedural constraints. With above definitions for procedural restrictions, an access control system tests each access following the procedure as Fig. 5 shows.
If a user accesses to a permission, access control system gets information of the session and the behavior, and check whether a PC is applied to the behavior or not. If a PC is applied, get the property of the PC. If the property is negative, deny executions of at least one behavior before all the behaviors in the PC are executed. In case of the positive, execute a behavior if all of the preliminary behaviors were executed and if it does not exceed the number of permitted repetitions.
In the decision process, it is possible that a conflict occurs owing to the reusability of behavior definitions. Assume that a behavior participates in two PCs, p1 and p2. If both p1 and p2 are positive PC, it is no problem to permit the executions. If both are negative, and the behavior is the last one of at least one PC, then the execution should be denied. If one PC is positive, and the other is negative, the denial or allowance is decided according to the policy of the system.
Analysis
As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the more accurate access control is possible with the procedural restrictions. Moreover, the extended model can refuse attacks that consist of legal operations. It has been unable to limit those attack trials in traditional access control of RBAC. log data -close'. But, it is prohibited to write some data to the logfile after a user locates the file pointer to an intended position by reading several records from the logfile.
In the right figure, a set of behavior is defined as a negative PC. Some version of sendmail program has a security flaw leaking administrator's authority. The race condition attack [18] can be used for the intrusion, and the attack tries to do 'unlink' and 'symlink' a temp file to '.rhosts' repeatedly. Therefore, if it is prohibited that the unlink/link repetition by defining negative PC, the system is free from race condition attacks. Figure 7 shows a part of the result of modeling constrained RBBAC. For the specification and analysis, we used Alloy [22] . In the figure, the diamonds are negative behaviors and the rectangles are positive behaviors. No positive behaviors are equivalent to negative behaviors.
However, this analysis is not yet complete because the concept of the order is not specified in the diagram. Though we used proof-based approach to specify RBBAC model, we need state-machine based approach to model procedural constraints.
In the Fig. 8 , we present the modeling result with Coloured Petri Net (CPN) [23] , [24] . The CPN is one of the state-machine approach and it represents concisely multi-user, multi-process systems. In the modeling, we present users, permissions, and Access Enforcement Functions (AEF) [21] as tokens, places, and transitions, respectively. Figure 8 is the overview of a system, and the positive and negative examples of Fig. 6 are presented as hierarchical subnets of Fig. 9, Fig. 10 , respectively. With the modeling tool, CPN Tools [25] , we can verify the correctness of the role assignments by checking liveness of each transition in PCs. Also, we are able to test the effectiveness of PC by checking reachability. For more analysis, the occurrence graph can be generated and analyzed for the confirmation, and simulations results are provided by the CPN Tools.
In the extended access control, the main decision process is similar to that of previous RBAC. In RBAC, if a user accesses an object, access control system check whether the permission on the object is associated with the user's acquired role. In the extended method, access control system checks if the behavior have the permission on the object is associated or not with the user's acquired role.
However, the extended access control is different with previous RBAC. In the previous concept, roles are the neutral entities which are placed between users and permissions. It can be interpreted as both, and it is the figuration of the mapping between users and permissions. On the con- trary, in the extended concept, roles and behaviors are the abstraction for users and permissions, respectively. They are interpreted as subjects and objects separately. And, in extended RBAC, there are no entities between roles and behaviors, and still associations are exist instead. It is different from the RBAC's visualization of the mapping. In other words, it is possible that the roles can be considered as groups with hierarchy, and behaviors as functions with nested structures.
Related Work
In this section, we introduce the previous research results in the area of workflow systems and IDSs.
The History Based SOD Enforcements
In workflow systems, the notion of the execution sequence has been adopted to enforce SOD policy: history-based SOD or context sensitive access control.
Sandhu [26] proposed the transaction control expressions to enforce a SOD policy. A transaction consists of multiple steps of roles, and it is required that all participants should be different in the transaction control expression. For the transaction control, historical information is used. When a SOD transaction is executed, the identities of the users are recorded. Using the recorded history, it is possible to prohibit two SOD roles are participate an execution of the transaction.
SOD is the multi-person control policy being defined between plural entities. The targets of SOD can be defined over the heterogeneous network, especially in workflow execution environments. To improve the interoperability in the notion of the transaction control, Papenfus and Botha [27] suggested the SOD description with XML.
TBAC [28] was proposed for dynamic access controls in workflow systems. The execution environment of the system is a distributed and heterogeneous. A workflow task is executed in the defined sequence by the workflow participants at distributed sites. In the dynamic environment, a centralized control can be overhead or cause vulnerabilities. The objective of TBAC is gathering context information for access controls closed to the execution sites. TBAC enforces access controls reflecting the conditions of the tasks' execution environment just-in-time. The framework of TBAC also bases on history based scheme of the transaction control [26] .
Damian et al. [29] proposed a context sensitive model to keep the principle of SOD reflecting frequently changing context information in workflow environments. They redefined the concept of the session, and proposed a workflow system in which authorizations are calculated based on the progress of the task execution.
Wainer et al. [30] defined W-RBAC grafting the concept of RBAC on the workflow system. The framework adopted a logic based language, and specifies the conditions for authorization with the language. The framework binds users and roles dynamically, and enforces dynamic SOD.
The previous results have researched for the enforcement of the SOD principles. They adopt the history information for the control, and it is the natural approach because the workflow is defined having the sequence of work items.
The extended access control in this paper is related with the previous work in terms of the expression of operation sequences and delicate SOD enforcement from the sequence control. However, the extension is distinguished from the previous researches in following points.
First, the objective of the extension is different as mentioned above. The related work mainly concerns enforcing the principle of SOD in workflow environments. To the contrary, the main objective of the extension is limiting attacks which are composed of ordinary operations in access control service. Namely, a kind of misuse detection approach is introduced to the previous RBAC model for our trusted operating system development.
The distinguished feature from the different objective is the adoption of the concept of negative permissions. Without the notion of negative permissions, we have to define all of the authorized operation sequences to deny such an attack as the race condition. In the world of workflow systems, this is not a big problem because workflow tasks are defined having a flow. However, in the trusted operating system development, it is not reasonable to define all of normal accesses with the procedural information. It is analogous to the discussions comparing the anomaly detection approach and the misuse detection approach in IDSs.
Second, the target of separation is different. In the previous researches, SOD relation mostly has been defined in subject-abstractions. SOD aims to exclude the possibility of plural subjects attack a system in conspiracy. In our extension, we bring down the focus into the lower level, per-mission level. In the extended RBAC model, a combination of some executions is inhibited by separating an abstracted permission with the other. In other words, the constraining relations are defined in object-abstractions. Specifically, it is the separation of executions. The traditional SOD schemes have not focused on the such fine grain separations. Therefore, they cannot deny such an attack as the race condition which is carried out with a single role.
The IDS Systems
The other research field which is related with the extended access control is the intrusion detection systems, specifically, the behavior modeling approaches.
IDSs are generally categorized as the misuse detection and the anomaly detection. On the other hand, Ko [31] proposed another approach of specification based intrusion detection. The specification based detection [31] specifies the security-related subset of the insisted behaviors with a formal language, and detects intrusions comparing the specification and audit data. Ko et al. [32] advanced this approach with machine learning methods. The specification approach is analogous to the anomaly detection, hence difficult to be adopted to trusted opearting systems; It is hard to to specify all of the normal behaviors in operating system kernel as previously mentioned.
Another efforts to specify the nominal behaviors and enforce anomaly detection mechanisms are as follows; Sekar et al. [33] specified system call sequences and arguments of valid processes, compiled the specifications to the finite automata. Elbaum and Munson [34] analyzed the internal behaviors with the dynamic software measurement framework based on profiles which are categorized as operational, functional, module, and execution profiles. Büschkes et al. [35] modeled correct behaviors as transactions, and Ghosh et al. [36] applied machine learning to profile system calls of normal operation condition. With the various specification techniques and profile information, they proposed the anomaly detection mechanisms. It is analogeous to the research results in the field of workflow systems (in Sect. 5.1), in terms of the modeling of normal execution sequences.
The extended access control in this paper is different from the IDS efforts in following points: the applicable domain and the modeling targets. We paid attention to limiting of the attack which consist ordinary operations, and adopted the misuse detect approach for the extension. Also, the application target of the access control is security kernel of trusted operating system. The access control model of RBAC is extended in the context of the reference monitoring services. Although, the intrusion detection services can be provided in application level as current IDSs are operated, the application level solutions are not fundamental solution as it is discussed in Sect. 2.2. The most important difference of the extended method from IDSs is that IDS cannot make a limited boundary of information flows, but our extension does. The extended method is basically an access control introducing intrusion detection technique by considering not only access matrix information, but also execution sequences as access control information. Moreover, we can expect the better performance from the integrated security services based on kernel level operations. It will be suitable for the embedded environments.
Conclusions
In this paper, we described an extended RBAC concept and model. By the extension, access control not only bases instant access control information but also continuous access information. Thus, access control efficiently limits attack trials which consist of allowed operation. The race condition attack was presented as an example of those attacks trials. The race condition attack is a kind of attack using time-ofcheck-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) [17] vulnerabilities. The attacks exploit inconsistencies of synchronization in multiuser environments and they use ordinary operations. We expect the extended method can deny more attacks based on similar mechanism.
Extended RBAC useful to prevent various knownattacks because the description of attack sequences is supported in procedural restrictions. It means the function of access control is expanded to the coverage of IDSs, though its ability has limitations due to performance overhead. However, for some attacks, access control provides more reliable solutions. Because access control is performed at the kernel level not being by-passed. It is different from IDSs which are executed in the application level.
While we describe the proposed model, several concepts of the standard RBAC model [16] such as inheritance, SSD, and DSD are not included. It is omitted to simplify the extension. We consider it is not difficult to introduce those constraints to the extended models because the extended model was originated from the core RBAC model.
